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Abstract
We generalize the equivalence of the non-symmetric Nash bargaining solution and the linear
division of the joint surplus when bargainers use diﬀerent utility scales. This equivalence in
the general case requires the surplus each agent receives to be expressed in compatible, or
comparable, units. This result is valid in the case of bargaining over multiple-issues. Our
conclusions have important implications for comparative static exercises and calibrated work.
For example, when comparing the joint surplus of economies with diﬀerent preferences, it is
crucial to lay out the surplus in terms of one utility unit or the other. On the other hand, while
it is necessary to transform the units when expressing the non-symmetric Nash bargaining so-
lution as a share of the joint surplus, it is not necessary to perform a unit transformation when
maximizing directly the generalized Nash product. Finally, we discuss the requirements on
the curvatures of the agents’ utility functions, or, in other words, on the bargainers’ attitudes
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11 Introduction
In order to compute the non-symmetric Nash bargaining solution there is an equivalence that
is well-known to, and widely-used by, economists.1 This equivalence allows to choose between
maximizing the generalized Nash product or ﬁnding the unique solution that linearly shares the
joint surplus. This equivalence holds, however, only where preferences of all involved agents are
identical.
The purpose of this work is to show that the surplus from bargaining obtained by each
individual at the non-symmetric Nash bargaining solution does in fact coincide with a linear
sharing of the total surplus from bargaining. In the general case, special attention has to be taken
to express the total surplus correctly. More precisely, we show that the linear sharing equivalence
holds when one applies a transformation to express all utility levels in the same units. Our
conclusions have important implications for comparative static exercises and calibrated work.
For example, when comparing the joint surplus of economies with diﬀerent preferences, it is
crucial to lay out the surplus in terms of one utility unit or the other. An obvious illustration
of this situation is when one wishes to look at the eﬀect on an economy of a change in risk
aversion. In this case, it is primordial to evaluate the joint surplus in similar utility units. In
addition, it is useful to stress that, while it is necessary to transform the units when expressing
the non-symmetric Nash bargaining solution as share of the joint surplus, it is not necessary to
perform a unit transformation when maximizing the generalized Nash product.
To see what we mean by “linear sharing equivalence” and why this problematic is important,
consider the following example. Think of two individuals bargaining about the division of 10
units of money. If they are not able to reach an agreement, both agents obtain zero. Assume
that individuals, named A and B, only care about their share of the units, yA and yB,w i t h
yA + yB = 10, and that they are risk neutral.
Example 1. For simplicity, let us take the utility of individuals A and B to be equal to the
amount of money they receive, yA and yB, respectively. The non-symmetric Nash bargaining








1See Pissarides (1985) , Blanchard and Diamond (1990), and Pissarides (2003). See also Rogerson et al. (2005)
for bargaining in matching models, and Rupert et. al. (2001) for bargaining in monetary economics.
2with α a number between 0 and 1. This solution gives agent A 10α units of money and agent B
10(1 − α) units of money. It is therefore clear that each agent gets their corresponding share of
the 10 units according to α and (1 − α).
As in Example 1 above, the linear sharing equivalence is often used in situations when all
agents have linear preferences, and it is only valid when agents have identical preferences at
the margin. With more general preferences, the division of the joint surplus might not be so
neatly done. In fact, a conversion rate (at the margin) has to be applied in order to express
each bargainer’s preferences the units of the other bargainer’s preferences. The next example
illustrates this. As before, two individuals bargain about the division of 10 units of money. In
case of disagreement, both agents obtain no payoﬀ and individuals, A and B, only care about
their share of the units, yA and yB,w i t hyA + yB = 10.
Example 2. Assume now that the utility of agent B stays as in Example 1, but the utility of
A is such that uA(yA)=
√
yA. The non-symmetric Nash bargaining solution (y∗
A,y∗








with α a number between 0 and 1. At the new speciﬁcation agent A obtains 10α
2−α units of
money, while agent B receives 20
2−α units of money. It now seems that agents are not sharing the
surplus according to the corresponding weights α and (1 − α) of the generalized Nash product.
If we look at the surplus in terms in utilities, we observe that uA(y∗





B) − uB(0) = 20
2−α, which does not seem an α,( 1− α)s p l i te i t h e r .
In the next section, we lay out the one-issue two-person bargaining problem, present the non-
symmetric Nash bargaining solution, explain the way to convert the scale of one individual into
the scale of the other one in order to measure the joint surplus, and show how the corresponding
linear shares of these measures coincide with the non-symmetric Nash bargaining solution. In
Section 3, we show that there is not always concordance between convexity of the feasible set of
the bargaining problem and the risk aversion of individual preferences. Furthermore, we discuss
in Section 4 the possibility that the maximization of the generalized Nash product on one-issue
settings can still be well deﬁned in terms of the linear sharing equivalence even if the feasible
set of the bargaining problem is not convex. Finally, in Section 5 we comment brieﬂy on how
the linear sharing equivalence still holds, and the transformation of units required for that, when
agents bargain over multiple issues.
32 Two-Person Bargaining Problems: The One-Issue Setting
A two-person bargaining problem is generically deﬁned as a pair (S,d), where S is a closed,
upper-bounded, comprehensive subset of ￿2 and d is an interior point in S.T h es e tS represents
the set of feasible utilities, while vector d is the disagreement point, also called disagreement
payoﬀ allocation, outside option or status quo.
We are interested in situations where bargaining takes place in terms of a variable x ∈￿
and where individuals A and B, engaged in bargaining, have utilities a(x) and b(x), respectively,
for each possible choice of x. For simplicity, assume that both a(x) and b(x) are monotonous,
continuous functions in ￿. Depending on the application, an interval of ￿, denoted X, is available




(a(x),b(x)) ∈￿ 2,w h e r ex ∈ X
￿
. (1)
Assumptions on the interval X and on functions a(x) and b(x)
1. Both a(x) and b(x) are diﬀerentiable, with a￿(x) > 0 and b￿(x) < 0 for all x ∈ X.T h i s
implies that both functions a and b have an inverse, namely a−1 and b−1,r e s p e c t i v e l y . 2
2. The disagreement point can be written as d =( a(xA),b(xB)), where xA and xB are shadow
values of x at disagreement. Typically, if no agreement is reached no decision about x will
be implemented. The values xA and xB are computed by means of the inverse functions
a−1 and b−1, namely xA = a−1 (dA) and xB = b−1 (dB), where d =( dA,d B). Furthermore,
xA <x B.
Assumption 1 restricts the problem to diﬀerentiable functions. This allows us to compute a
closed-form solution and infer its properties. Assumption 2 means that there is a subinterval of
X, namely [xA,x B], such that feasible utility levels for both agents are over the disagreement
point. Note that given that a(x) is an increasing function of x, anything to the right of xA yields
a higher utility than d for agent A, while, given that b(x) is a decreasing function of x, anything
to the left of xB yields a higher utility than d for agent B. We check now that S fulﬁlls the usual
assumptions found in the bargaining theory literature.
Assumptions on S
2See Sydsaeter and Hammond (1995) Section 7.6, p. 240.
41. Essentiality. We say that the bargaining problem is essential if there is at least one v ∈ F
such that di <v i for i = A,B. By assumption 2 above we know that any point x ∈ [xA,x B]
generates a pair of utilities v =( a(x),b(x)) satisfying the condition.
2. Closeness. The utilities on the utility possibilities frontier F are feasible, i.e., F ⊂ S. F is
continuous, which is true for a(x) and b(x) continuous on X,w h e r eX is an interval.
3. Upper Boundedness. F is the upper frontier of S: If a vector of utilities u satisﬁes that
u ≥ v with u ￿= v for a vector v ∈ F,t h e nu/ ∈ S, or, in words, u cannot be feasible. We have





,w i t hz = a(x), for any x ∈ X. As we mentioned before, the inverse
function a−1 exists. Furthermore, it is diﬀerentiable since a is. By applying the chain rule















where a(x)=z.3 Recall that, by assumption, b￿ (x) < 0 and a￿ (x) > 0, for any x in the
interval X. Hence, f￿(z) < 0.
But if f(z) is a decreasing line in the orthant (z,f(z)) then F draws a decreasing line in the
orthant of utilities since, by deﬁnition of F and f, F = {(z,f(z)), where z = a(x),x ∈ X}.
4. Free disposal. Agents can choose to dispose of resources, i.e., the set S is comprehensive.
This implies that for any vector of utilities v in the frontier F it has to be that all vectors
u ≤ v are in S.
It is the case that S satisﬁes Assumptions 1-4, we can therefore deﬁne the one-issue bargaining
problem as a pair (S,d), where
S =
￿
u ∈￿ 2 such that u ≤ v for some v ∈ F
￿
, (2)
where the set F is deﬁned as in (16), and d =( a(xA),b(xB)).
3See Sydsaeter and Hammond (1995) Section 7.6, Theorem 7.9 on page 243 for the derivative of an inverse
function, and Section 5.2 for the chain rule.
5The assumption of convexity of S
Note that in order to deﬁne a one-issue bargaining problem we have not imposed the feasible
set S to be a convex set. In the seminal works on bargaining theory, the set S of feasible utilities
is usually assumed to be convex (see among others Nash (1950), Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975), Kalai
(1977a), but also reference text books as Mas-Colell et al (1995) or Myerson (1991).) Convexity
is justiﬁed by assuming that players can agree to jointly randomized strategies, so that, if the
utility allocations x and y are feasible then the expected utility allocation θx+(1− θ)y can also
be achieved by bargainers by means of a randomizing device that implements x with probability θ
and y with probability 1−θ. In addition, the usual justiﬁcations for the use of the non-symmetric
Nash bargaining solution, Kalai (1977b) –using a replica argument– and Rubinstein (1982) –from
a strategic point of view–, assume that the set of feasible utilities is convex. Up to our knowledge,
only the work by Zhou (1997) studies the non-symmetric Nash bargaining solution for non convex
problems, and he does so from an axiomatic point of view.4
In our one-issue setting, convexity of S requires that the function f(z)=b(a−1(z)), for
z = a(x) and x ∈ [xA,x B] to be concave. Assume that a and b are twice diﬀerentiable, f(z) has
to be such that f￿￿(z) ≤ 0.
Recall that f￿(z)=
b￿(x)




















Given that a￿(x) > 0 and b￿(x) < 0 for x ∈ [xA,x B], condition (3) above is true if both a￿￿(x) ≤ 0
and b￿￿(x) ≤ 0, but the converse is not true in general.
4The seminal works by Nash (1950), (1953) deal with symmetric solutions, which in our setting means α =
1
2.
Some papers have dealt with the symmetric Nash bargaining solution for non convex sets. See for example Roth
(1977), Kaneko (1980) and Conley and Wilkie (1996).
62.1 The Non-Symmetric Nash Bargaining Solution
For generic two-person bargaining problems (S,d), the non-symmetric Nash bargaining solution




α (vB − dB)
1−α , (4)
where v =( vA,v B), d =( dA,d B) and α ∈ (0,1). In our one-issue setting, maximizing this





α (f(z) − b(xB))
1−α . (5)
Recall that f(z)=b(a−1(z)), or, in other words, f(z)=b(x) for a(x)=z.
Convexity of S ensures that the Nash bargaining solution, in general bargaining settings, is
unique and interior. Namely, we prove the following statement in the mathematical appendix:
Proposition 1 Let f(z) be deﬁned as above, with z = a(x),f o ra n yx ∈ [xA,x B].I f f￿(z) <
0 and f￿￿(z) ≤ 0, then the generalized Nash product as a function of z is strictly concave in
[a(xA),a(xB)].
Proposition 1 states that, if the set of feasible utilities S is convex, maximizing the generalized
Nash product, as a function of z = a(x), yields a unique, interior solution z∗ ∈ [a(xa),a(xB)].
Given that a is a monotone, increasing function of x, this means that x∗ = a−1(z∗) is the non-
symmetric Nash bargaining solution and is unique and interior to [xa,x B]. In particular and very
importantly for our results, the ﬁrst order condition of the maximization problem in our one-issue
setting is necessary and suﬃcient, and therefore the linear sharing equivalence will hold.
2.2 Measuring the Joint Surplus
Fix a bargaining agreement or solution x∗. We can deﬁne the bargaining surplus for agent A as
the diﬀerence a(x∗) − a(xA). Similarly, we can also deﬁne the bargaining surplus for agent B as
the diﬀerence b(x∗) − b(xB). In situations where the surplus of both individuals is measured in
the same units, as for example in terms of money (see Example 1 of the introduction), the joint
surplus from bargaining can be deﬁned as the sum of both surpluses, i.e.,
JS(x∗)=a(x∗) − a(xA)+b(x∗) − b(xB).
7Unfortunately, when utility units are not the same across individuals, the joint surplus cannot
be the sum of utilities. A transformation of utils of A into utils of B, and vice versa, has to be
applied. A natural transformation makes use of the marginal utilities evaluated at the bargaining
agreement.
The change of utils of A per marginal change of utils of B at a given agreement x, or the





b￿(x). Note that this number is negative in general, since a￿(x) > 0 and b￿(x) < 0.
Therefore, starting at a given agreement x, if we want to increase the utility of B by one unit






￿ units (in utils of A). At the margin and in







of A. Applying this transformation rule to the bargaining surplus, the joint surplus at the Nash










In Example 1 of the Introduction, |b￿(x∗)| = a￿(x∗) and therefore JSA(x∗)=JSB(x∗). In-
tuitively, x measures units of money and for both agents A and B in Example 1 one unit of
money transforms into one util. Hence, the exchange of utils of A into utils of B is a one-to-one
transformation.
2.3 From the Non-Symmetric Nash Bargaining Solution to the Joint Surplus
We show that, at the non-symmetric Nash bargaining solution x∗, each of the agents obtains a
share of the generalized joint surplus. This share is equal to the corresponding weights in the
Nash product, α and 1 − α, exactly like in the well-known case of agents using the same units
presented in Example 1. The diﬀerence is that the generalized joint surplus has to be measured
in utils of A if we are computing the share for agent A. Equivalently, the generalized joint surplus
has to be measured in units of B if we are computing the share for agent B.
Recall that any number z∗ solving (5) has to lie interior of the interval [a(xA),a(xB)]. This
means that the ﬁrst order condition of the maximization problem has to be satisﬁed with equality.
Therefore, z∗ solves:
(z∗ − a(xA))










8Given that z∗ = a(x∗) and f￿(z∗)=
b￿(x)
a￿(x) we can rewrite the ﬁrst order condition in (6) as:
(a(x∗) − a(xA))











Since x∗ ∈ (xA,x B) we know that a(x∗) >a (xA) and b(x∗) >b (xB). This implies that equation
(7) is true if and only if:










given that b￿(x∗) ￿= 0 and |b￿(x∗)| = −b￿(x∗). But equation (8) means that the surplus of agent A
is the α share of the joint surplus measured in utils of A,i . e . ,
a(x∗) − a(xA)=αJSA(x∗). (9)
Equivalently, and given that a￿(x∗) ￿= 0,
b(x∗) − b(xB)=( 1− α)JSB(x∗). (10)
Controlling for utility units, therefore, the Nash Bargaining solution does in fact prescribe the
α,1 − α split!
3 Convexity of the Feasible Set and Bargainers Risk Aversion
As the reader may well be aware by now, the shapes of a and b cannot be directly interpreted as
the attitudes of the bargainers towards risk. In Examples 1 and 2, where the function a(x)i sa
direct utility function over x it is the case. A risk averse A-type bargainer will have a￿￿(x) < 0, a
risk neutral A-type bargainer will have a￿￿(x) = 0 and, ﬁnally, a risk lover A-type bargainer will
have a￿￿(x) > 0. What about B-type bargainers?
In the example of money division, for instance, a B-type individual might have the usual utility
function uB deﬁned on another variable y negatively correlated with x (for example, y = 10−x).
Assume y￿(x) < 0. Then our one-issue bargaining problem takes b(x)=uB(y(x)). Applying the
chain rule:
1. b￿(x)=u￿





It is easily seen how the convexity of b is not exactly equal to the convexity of uB and viceversa.
Although u￿￿
B(y)[y￿(x)]
2 ≤ 0 for a risk averse individual, b￿￿(x) might be negative or not depending
on the sign of y￿￿(x). In the money division problems as in Examples 1 and 2, y￿￿(x) = 0, and
therefore a B-type bargainer is (i) risk averse if b￿￿(x) < 0, (ii) risk neutral if b￿￿(x) = 0, and (iii)
risk lover if b￿￿(x) > 0. In more complex situations the relationship is not as straightforward, as
we show in the next example.
Example 3. A Firm-Worker Bargaining over Wages
Assume the A-type bargainer is a worker that values money with some risk averse utility
function on money. The ﬁrm’s owner has utility over proﬁt with a risk loving attitude, i.e.,
uB(y)=y2,w h e r ey is proﬁt. Proﬁt is obviously related to the salary paid to the worker, but
not in a linear way. Assume y =
√
x − x,w h e r ex is a salary between 0 and 1. If we assume
that the worker has the right to a subsidy equal to 1
16 and that the ﬁrm could earn a proﬁt of at
most 9
16 if he does not hire the current worker with whom he is about to bargain the salary, we
have that (i) b￿(x) < 0 and (ii) b￿￿(x) ≤ 0. Therefore, the one-issue bargaining problem looks like
bargaining between two risk averse individuals in the simple money division problem, where the
Nash product is concave on z (and on x, see next section for that) and the set of feasible utilities
S is convex.
4 Convexity of the Feasible Set and concavity of the generalized
Nash product as a function of x
We have shown that the convexity of S implies that the generalized Nash product is concave as a
function of z = a(x). Nevertheless, we are interested in the Nash bargaining solution written in
terms of the issue x. This is why in many applications the generalized Nash product is maximized
as a function of x. It happens that for one-issue settings, the ﬁrst order condition for an interior
solution is equivalent whether we maximize with respect to x or with respect to z. Unfortunately,
one can be tempted to check the concavity of the generalized Nash product as a function of x, and
not as a function of z. We now show that the fact that the generalized Nash product, expressed as
a function of z, is concave in z does not automatically imply that the generalized Nash product,
expressed as a function of x, is concave in x. The shape of a(x) is very relevant.
10If G(z) denotes the generalized Nash product as a function of z, and N(x) stands as the
generalized Nash product as a function of x, it is clear that G(a(x)) = N(x). Note that the order
of composition of the functions G and a should be inverted in order to preserve concavity, but






￿2 + G￿ (a(x))a￿￿(x).
The assumption about convexity of S implies that G(z) is concave and therefore G￿￿ (a(x)) < 0.
This implies that G￿￿ (a(x))[a￿(x)]
2 < 0. Unfortunately, depending on the value of G￿ (a(x))a￿￿(x)
the function N(x) could be concave or not.
Furthermore, it could be that the function N(x) is concave in x but the set of feasible alterna-
tives S is not convex. This would still guarantee a unique, interior solution of the maximization
of N(x) as a function of x, without the requirement of convexity. The intuition behind this fact is
that there are some bargaining problems where the set of alternatives is not convex but still the
non-symmetric Nash bargaining solution is interior and unique. To see how this could happen,
recall that the condition for S to be convex, in terms of the primitives of the model, is that
f￿(z)=
b(x)


















































5By preservation of concavity we mean the following. Take three functions f, g and h with compatible domains
such that f = g ◦h.I fh is concave and g is nondecreasing, then f is concave. Note that N = G◦a, therefore what
we call the inverted order, since G is the one concave, and a is nondecreasing.
11If both a￿￿(x) and b￿￿(x) are positive the assumption of concavity with respect to x holds. But
the assumption on concavity with respect to x does not imply that the set S of utilities is convex,
although when the assumption of concavity holds the non-symmetric Nash bargaining solution
x∗ is unique. Consider the following example of money division.
Example 4. A money division problem where the generalized Nash product is concave in x but
the set of feasible alternatives is not convex in ￿2
+.
Consider, as in Examples 1 and 2 of the introduction, two individuals bargaining about the
division of 10 units of money. If they are not able to reach an agreement, both agents obtain
zero. Assume now that uA(yA)=
√
yA and uB(yB)=y2
B with yA + yB = 10. Fix x = yA.T h e n ,
a(x)=uA(x)=
√
x and b(x)=uB(10 − x) = (10 − x)2. Furthermore, xA = 0 and xB = 10.




4x2 +( 1− α)
2
(10 − x)




































> (1 − α)
2
(10 − x)2,
for α ≥ 1
2 and given that (1 − α) α
4x2 > 0. Therefore, if α ≥ 1
2 condition (15) above is satisﬁed
(strictly) and the function N(x) is strictly concave.
Nevertheless, condition (3) guaranteeing convexity of S is not satisﬁed for all x ∈ [0,10]. To





which is true only for x ≤ 10
3 .
5 Extensions to Multiple-issue Bargaining Settings
What if bargaining takes place over multiple issues? Clearly, the joint surplus has to be measured
in terms of units of individual A or in terms of units of individual B as before. But since there are
multiple issues, any of these issues could be taken as a reference (at the margin). We show now
that at the Nash bargaining solution, it does not matter which issue is taken as a reference, since
12at the margin they all give the same rate of exchange of units of A for units of B and viceversa.
Let us now be more formal.
Assume for this section that bargaining takes place in terms of a vector of variables x ∈￿ m,
where m ≥ 2 is the number of issues that are relevant in the bargaining process. In the ﬁrm-
worker setting, bargaining can take place in terms of both wage per hour and number of hours of
labor, and therefore m would be equal to 2. Similar to before, individuals A and B, engaged in
bargaining, have utilities a(x) and b(x), respectively, for each possible choice of x. For simplicity,
assume that both a(x) and b(x) are continuous functions in ￿. Depending on the application,
a compact set of ￿m, denoted X, is available to bargainers if agreement is reached. The utility
possibility frontier is therefore the set F ∈￿ 2 deﬁned as
F =
￿
(a(x),b(x)) ∈￿ 2,w h e r ex ∈ X
￿
. (16)
Assumptions for the m case
1. Both a(x) and b(x) are twice diﬀerentiable for all x ∈ X. Furthermore, for any agreement
x and any of its issues xi we have that if
∂a(x)
∂xi > 0t h e n
∂b(x)
∂xi < 0 and viceversa.
2. The disagreement point can be written as d =( a(xA),b(xB)), where xA and xB are shadow
values of x at disagreement.
3. The generalized Nash product (z − a(xA))
α (f(z) − b(xB))
1−α is a concave function on z =
a(x) ∈ Z,w h e r eZ = z ∈￿such that z = a(x) and x ∈ Xm and f(z)=b(x) for x such
that a(x)=z.
The assumption on the opposite signs of the partial derivatives with respect to the same
issue is related to the concavity assumption. If both partial derivatives are of the same sign, say
positive, it means that both individuals would like to agree on a higher value of xi. Any agreement
maximizing the generalized Nash product would set the value of xi as high possible, and therefore
there is no interior maximizer of the generalized Nash product. The same applies if one of the
derivatives is null, the other being positive. Similarly, if at least one of the partial derivatives is
negative and the other non positive, the maximizer of the generalized Nash product will ﬁx x∗
i
equal to the lowest value possible, and again there is no interior solution of the maximization
problem.
13In this multiple-issue setting, we propose the following modiﬁcations of the joint surplus:
JSi















A(x) is the joint surplus of A and B at the agreement x when measured in utils of
A where the ith issue is taken as a reference. The joint surplus measured in utils of A may diﬀer











Proposition 2 Take the multi-issue two-person bargaining procedure deﬁned just above. If the
assumptions for the m case hold, the nonsymmetric Nash bargaining solution x∗ =( x∗
i)i∈1,...,m ∈




b(x∗) − b(xB)=( 1− α)JSi
B(x∗), (19)
for any issue i.
Proposition 2 implies in particular that the joint surplus measured in utils of A is the same
independently of the issue that we take as a reference at the nonsymmetric Nash bargaining
solution. The same can be said about the joint surplus measured in utils of B. This is not true in
general for any agreement x of the domain Xm, but it has to be true for the nonsymmetric Nash
bargaining solution x∗ when the latter is interior to Xm. This implies very importantly that the
rate of exchange of utils of A into utils of B at the non-symmetric Nash bargaining solution is
the same no matter which of its issues is taken as a reference.
Proof of Proposition 2. Given the assumptions, there is an interior solution z∗ to the
generalized Nash product in the utility space and the ﬁrst order as in equation 6 is necessary
and suﬃcient. Unfortunately, we are also interested in the optimal value of the issues x∗, and
14not only on the optimal value of the utility z∗,w h e r ez∗ = f(x∗). Given that x is in this case a








where ai(x)( r e s p . bi(x)) is the partial derivative of a(x)( r e s p . b(x)) with respect to the i-th
element, xi.
Consider the maximization of the generalized product as a function of x, and not as a function




α (b(x) − b(xB))
1−α . (21)
If x∗ satisﬁes the ﬁrst order solution of this problem it has to be true, for each issue x∗
i
αai(x∗)(b(x∗) − b(xB)) + (1 − α)bi(x∗)(a(x∗) − a(xA)) = 0, (22)
which is the same as
a(x∗) − a(xA)=α
￿






for any issue i. It remains to check that condition 22, for each issue i, implies the ﬁrst order
condition of the maximization problem in the utility space. It is easy to see that equation 22, for
each issue i, implies that
αai(x∗)dxi (b(x∗) − b(xB)) + (1 − α)bi(x∗)dxi (a(x∗) − a(xA)) = 0,




ai(x∗)dxi (b(x∗) − b(xB)) + (1 − α)
m ￿
i=1
bi(x∗)dxi (a(x∗) − a(xA)) = 0,
which is the same as




(a(x∗) − a(xA)) = 0. (23)
Fix z∗ = a(x∗) and f(z∗)=b(x∗) and recall that f￿(z)=
￿m
i=1 bi(x)dxi ￿m
i=1 ai(x)dxi. Rewriting (23) we obtain
α(f(z∗) − b(xB)) + (1 − α)f￿(z∗)(z∗ − a(xA)) = 0, (24)
i.e., z∗ = a(x∗) satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition of 5 and it is therefore the non-symmetric Nash
bargaining solution under Assumptions 1 to 3 of the multi-issue setting.
156 Final Comments
We have shown that the solution to the Nash Bargaining problem takes the form of a linear split
of the joint surplus even when agents diﬀer in preferences, provided the joint surplus is expressed
in terms of similar utility units. The necessity of spelling out the joint surplus in compatible
utility units is also crucial when comparing the surplus, or the total welfare, of economies with
agents diﬀering in utility. An important example is when comparing the joint surplus of economies
calibrated to diﬀerent risk aversion parameters.
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Mathematical Appendix
Proposition 1. Let f(z) be as deﬁned above, with z = a(x), for any x ∈ [xA,x B]. If f￿(z) < 0
and f￿￿(z) ≤ 0, then the generalized Nash product, say G(z), as a function of z is concave in
[a(xA),a(xB)].
Proof. By deﬁnition, G(z)=( z − zA)
α (f(z) − f(zB)





















































These last two things together imply, by (25), that G￿￿(z) < 0. Hence, the generalized Nash
product is a (strict) concave function on z = a(x) if the set of utilities S is convex.
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